Bounded forcing axioms and Baumgartner's conjecture by Aspero, David et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
10
2.
22
75
v1
  [
ma
th.
LO
]  
11
 Fe
b 2
01
1
BOUNDED FORCING AXIOMS AND BAUMGARTNER’S
CONJECTURE
DAVID ASPERO´, SY-DAVID FRIEDMAN, MIGUEL ANGEL MOTA,
AND MARCIN SABOK
Abstract. We study the spectrum of forcing notions between the iter-
ations of σ-closed followed by ccc forcings and the proper forcings. This
includes the hierarchy of α-proper forcings for indecomposable countable
ordinals α as well as the Axiom A forcings. We focus on the bounded
forcing axioms for the hierarchy of α-proper forcings and connect them
to a hierarchy of weak club guessing principles. We show that they are,
in a sense, dual to each other. In particular, these weak club guessing
principles separate the bounded forcing axioms for distinct countable
indecomposable ordinals. In the study of forcings completely embed-
dable into an iteration of σ-closed followed by ccc forcing, we present
an equivalent characterization of this class in terms of Baumgartner’s
Axiom A. This resolves a well-known conjecture of Baumgartner from
the 1980’s.
1. Introduction
After the discovery of finite support iteration [13] and Martin’s Axiom
[9], the technique of iterated forcing was dramatically extended through
consideration of iterations with countable support. The classical paper of
Baumgartner and Laver [4] on countable support iterations of Sacks forcing
was developed further by Baumgartner into the theory of Axiom A forcing
[3]. Baumgartner’s Axiom A captures many of the common features of
ccc, σ-closed and tree-like forcings and is sufficient to guarantee that ω1 is
not collapsed in a countable support iteration. The more general theory of
proper forcing was later developed by Shelah [12] and has replaced Axiom A
as the central notion in the theory of iterated forcing with countable support.
Together with the introduction of proper forcing, Shelah also considered
the notion of α-proper forcing [12, Chapter V] for indecomposable countable
One visit of David Aspero´ at the KGRC in Vienna was supported by the INFTY
programme of the ESF through an exchange grant and by the University of Vienna through
a short research contract.
Sy-David Friedman, Miguel Angel Mota and Marcin Sabok would like to thank the
FWF (the Austrian Science Fund) for its support through the grant no P 22430-N13.
Marcin Sabok was partially supported by MNiSW (the Polish Ministry of Science and
Higher Education) through grant number N N201 418939. Two visits of Marcin Sabok at
the Kurt Go¨del Research Center in Vienna were supported by the the INFTY programme
of the European Science Foundation through exchange grants no 2535 and 3010 and by
the Austrian-Polish bilateral grant no 01/2009.
1
2 D. ASPERO´, S.-D. FRIEDMAN, M.A. MOTA, AND M. SABOK
ordinals α. Forcings which are α-proper for all countable ordinals are called
<ω1-proper. Years later, Ishiu [7] proved the striking result that the notions
of Axiom A and <ω1-properness are in fact the same, meaning that, up
to forcing-equivalence, they describe the same classes of quasi-orders. This
also explained an earlier result of Koszmider [8] saying that Axiom A is
preserved by countable-support iteration.
Baumgartner showed that the analogue of Martin’s Axiom for proper
forcing, called PFA (the Proper Forcing Axiom) is consistent relative to a
supercompact cardinal and it is conjectured that its consistency strength
is exactly that. PFA and the forcing axioms for the classes of α-proper
forcings (written as PFAα) were later systematically studied by Shelah [12].
However, a still very useful weakening of PFA considered by Goldstern and
Shelah [5] and called BPFA (the Bounded Proper Forcing Axiom) turned
out to have much lower consistency strength, below that of a Mahlo cardinal.
In addition, some important consequences of PFA, such as the Todorcˇevic´–
Velicˇkovic´ result that c = ℵ2 holds under PFA, were shown to also follow
from BPFA [11]. On the other hand, one should remember that the proof of
Todorcˇevic´–Velicˇkovic´ in fact only uses FA(σ-closed ∗ ccc), i.e. the forcing
axiom for the class of forcings completely embeddable into an iteration of σ-
closed followed by ccc forcing. We will say that a forcing is embeddable into
σ-closed ∗ ccc if it is forcing-equivalent to a forcing which can be completely
embedded into an iteration of σ-closed followed by ccc forcing.
Given a class of forcing notions S, the Bounded Forcing Axiom for S,
denoted by BFA(S), is the statement that for each complete Boolean algebra
B in S and any collection D of ω1-many size at most ω1 predense subsets of
B, there is a filter on B which intersects each element of D. An equivalent
form of of BFA(S), due independently to Bagaria [2] and Stavi–Va¨a¨na¨nen
[14], states that H(ω2)
V is Σ1-elementary in H(ω2)
V B for any complete
Boolean algebra B in S.
The Bounded Forcing Axiom for the class of ccc forcing notions is equiv-
alent to Martin’s Axiom and the Bounded Forcing Axiom for the class of
proper forcings is exactly BPFA. In fact, there is a whole spectrum of forc-
ing axioms, namely the Bounded Forcing Axioms for the classes of α-proper
forcing notions (written as BPFAα), where α can be any countable indecom-
posable ordinal. There is also the Bounded Forcing Axiom for <ω1-proper
forcing notions, which is (a priori) weaker than all BPFAα. By the result
of Ishiu, it is equivalent to the Bounded Forcing Axiom for the class of
Axiom A forcings, also denoted by BAAFA. A still (a priori) weaker vari-
ation is the Bounded Forcing Axiom for the class of forcings embeddable
into σ-closed ∗ ccc. We denote this axiom by BFA(σ-closed ∗ ccc). Remark-
ably, Todorcˇevic´ showed (see [16] or [1, Lemma 2.4]) that the consistency
strength of BFA(σ-closed ∗ ccc) is the same as of BPFA, i.e. a reflecting
cardinal. This implies that actually all the axioms along this hierarchy have
the same consistency strength.
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In [17] Weinert showed that BAAFA is strictly weaker than BPFA, relative
to a reflecting cardinal. In this paper we separate the axioms BPFAα for all
indecomposable countable ordinals. We consider a hierarchy of weak club
guessing principles TWCGα (for a definition see Section 2) and show the
following
Theorem 1.1. For indecomposable ordinals α < β < ω1 the axiom BPFAα
(or PFAα) is consistent with TWCGα, relative to a reflecting cardinal (or
a supercompact), whereas BPFAα is inconsistent with TWCGβ .
The weak club guessing principles were introduced already by Shelah, who
considered them as a variant of the full (or tail) club guessing principles (cf.
[7]). Theorem 1.1 actually refines the separation of the axioms PFAα due to
Shelah [12, Chapter XVII], which was done in terms of the full club guessing
principles. We also show the following.
Theorem 1.2. For indecomposable ordinals α < β < ω1, the principle
TWCGβ implies TWCGα and TWCGα does not imply TWCGβ .
The role of the forcings embeddable into σ-closed ∗ ccc was already recog-
nized by Baumgartner, who actually conjectured that every forcing satisfy-
ing Axiom A can be embedded into an iteration of a σ-closed followed by a
ccc forcing. This would of course mean that the two classes are in fact the
same, up to forcing-equivalence. Probably, the first motivation came with
the Mathias forcing and its decomposition into P (ω)/fin followed by the
Mathias forcing with an ultrafilter. Later, the conjecture was confirmed for
the Sacks forcing and other tree-like forcing notions in [6]. Miyamoto [10]
proved it for the iterations of a ccc followed by a σ-closed forcing. Recently,
Zapletal proved that in most cases if an idealized forcing is proper, then it
is in fact embeddable into σ-closed ∗ ccc [19, Theorems 4.1.5, 4.2.4, 4.3.26,
4.5.9, Lemma 4.7.7].
We introduce the notion of a strong Axiom A forcing (for a precise defi-
nition see Section 3), which is basically saying that a forcing satisfies Axiom
A after taking a product with any σ-closed forcing. We prove the following
characterization.
Theorem 1.3. Let P be a forcing notion. The following are equivalent
(i) P satisfies strong Axiom A,
(ii) P is embeddable into σ-closed ∗ ccc.
Theorem 1.3 is in fact a confirmation of Baumgartner’s conjecture as it
says that there indeed is a close connection between Axiom A and embed-
dability into σ-closed and ccc. This characterization cannot, however, be
strengthened to the one suggested by Baumgartner because Theorem 1.3
leads also to the following counterexample.
Corollary 1.4. There is an Axiom A forcing notion which is not embeddable
into σ-closed ∗ ccc. It is of the form ccc ∗σ-closed ∗ ccc.
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the results on the
weak club guessing principles and the bounded forcing axioms for α-proper
forcings. Section 3 contains the characterization of forcings embeddable into
σ-closed ∗ ccc.
1.1. Remark. After this work has been done, we have learnt that Todorcˇevic´
can also derive Corollary 1.4 from the results of his [15, Section 2]; this proof
has, however, never been published.
2. Bounded forcing axioms and weak club guessing
Definition 2.1. Let κ > ω be a regular cardinal, α an ordinal and M =
{Mε : ε ∈ α} be a sequence of countable elementary substructures of H(κ).
We say that M is an internally approachable tower if the following hold:
(i) {Mε : ε ≤ η} ∈Mη+1 for every η ∈ α with η + 1 ∈ α,
(ii) Mη =
⋃
{Mε : ε < η} for every limit ordinal η ∈ α.
As usual, H(κ) is the collection of all sets of hereditary cardinality less
than κ. We will identify H(κ) with the structure 〈H(κ),∈,⊳〉, where ⊳ is
a fixed well order of H(κ).
Definition 2.2. Let P be a partial order and α a countable ordinal.
(a) Given q ∈ P and M = {Mε : ε ∈ α} an internally approachable
tower of countable elementary substructures of H(κ) with P ∈ M0,
we say that q is generic over M if q forces that G˙ ∩Mε is generic
over Mε for every ε ∈ α.
(b) P is α-proper if for every sufficiently large regular cardinal κ, for
every internally approachable tower M = {Mε : ε ∈ α} as above
and for every condition p ∈ P ∩M0, there exists q ≤ p such that q is
(M, P )-generic. P is <ω1-proper if it is α-proper for each α < ω1.
Note that if P is proper (i.e., 1-proper), then P is n-proper for every
natural number n. Recall that a countable ordinal β is said to be indecom-
posable if there exists a nonzero ordinal τ such that β = ωτ (this is ordinal
exponentiation). Equivalently, β is indecomposable if for every γ < β, the
order type of the interval (γ, β) is equal to β. Now, if P is α-proper and
β is the first indecomposable ordinal above α, then P is γ-proper for every
γ < β.
Let α be an indecomposable ordinal. We denote by PFAα the forcing
axiom for the class of α-proper forcing notions. By BPFAα we denote the
bounded forcing axiom for this class.
Definition 2.3. An α-ladder system is a sequence A¯ = 〈Aβ : β < ω1〉 such
that for each β < ω1, with α dividing β, the set Aβ is a closed unbounded
subset of β and ot(Aβ) = α. We will always assume that 〈Aβ(τ) : τ < α〉 is
the increasing enumeration of the elements of Aβ. We say that an α-ladder
system 〈Aβ : β < ω1〉 is thin if for any β < ω1 the set {Aγ ∩ β : γ ∈ ω1} is
countable.
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Definition 2.4. The α-Weak Club Guessing principle, denoted by WCGα
says that there is an α-ladder system A¯ such that for every club D ⊆ ω1
there is β ∈ D such that α divides β and ot(Aβ ∩D) = α. The α-Thin Weak
Club Guessing principle, denoted by TWCGα, also asserts the existence of
such an A¯ but with the additional requirement of being thin.
Thin (full) club guessing ladder systems have been considered in the lit-
erature in [18, 7]. Zapletal mentions [18, Section 1.A] that their existence
can be derived from ♦ and shows [18, Section 2] how to force one with a
σ-closed forcing notion.
Theorem 2.5. For indecomposable ordinals α < β < ω1, BPFAα implies
the negation of TWCGβ .
Proof. By the Σ1(H(ω2)) generic absoluteness characterization of BPFAα,
it suffices to prove that for any thin β-club guessing sequence A¯ there is an
α-proper forcing notion shooting a club in ω1 which is not guessed by A¯.
Fix a thin β-club guessing sequence A¯ = 〈Aγ : γ < ω1〉. Let P be the
following forcing notion. Conditions in P are countable subsets C of ω1 such
that
• C is closed in the order topology,
• ot(C ∩Aγ) < β for each γ < ω1 with β dividing γ.
The ordering ≤P on P is the end-extension. We need to show that P is
α-proper. Let κ be a sufficiently large regular cardinal and let ⊳ be a well-
ordering on H(κ). Pick an internally approachable towerM = 〈Mγ : γ < α〉
of countable elementary submodels of 〈H(κ),∈,⊳〉 such that A¯ ∈ M0. Put
ργ =Mγ∩ω1. Let p ∈M0 be any condition in P . We need to find a condition
extending p and generic for the whole tower. For so doing, consider the ⊳-
least ω-ladder system B¯ and note that B¯ ∈M0.
Say that X ⊆ ω1 isM-accessible if the order type of X is strictly less than
ρ0 and X ∩ ργ ∈Mγ+1 for every γ < α. Note that each Aγ is M-accessible
by thinness. For each M-accessible X ⊆ ω1 we construct by induction a
decreasing sequence of conditions p(γ,X) for γ ≤ α such that for each γ ≤ α
we have
(i) p(0,X) = p,
(ii) p(γ,X) is a P -generic condition for 〈Mδ : δ < γ〉,
(iii) if γ = δ + 1, then p(γ,X) ∩ (Aρδ ∪X) ⊆ p ∪ {ρε : ε ≤ δ}.
(iv) p(γ,X) ∈Mγ for successor γ and p(γ,X) ∈Mγ+1 for limit γ
Here Mα+1 = H(κ). In order to guarantee that (iv) holds, we will also
require the following conditions
(v) p(γ,X) =
⋃
n<ω p(Bγ(n),X ∪Aργ ) for limit γ,
(vi) p(γ + 1,X) = p(γ,X) for limit γ,
(vii) if γ < α is zero or successor, then p(γ+1,X) is the ⊳-least condition
which extends p(γ,X) and satisfies (i), (ii) and (iii).
Put p(0,X) = p. Suppose γ ≤ α and p(δ,X) have been constructed for
all δ < γ. If γ is limit, then p(γ,X) is defined as in (v). If γ = δ + 1 and
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δ is a limit, then p(γ,X) = p(δ,X). Suppose γ = δ + 1 and δ is zero or a
successor, in which case p(δ,X) ∈Mδ. We need to show that there exists a
condition extending p(δ,X) and satisfying (ii) and (iii).
Enumerate all dense open subsets of P in Mδ into a sequence 〈Dn :
n < ω〉 (assume D0 = P ) and inductively construct a decreasing sequence of
conditions pn ∈Mδ∩Dn such that p
0 = p(δ,X) and pn∩(Aρδ∪X) = p(δ,X).
Suppose pn ∈Mδ has been constructed and let η
n = sup(pn). Consider the
function f : ω1 \ η
n → ω1 defined as follows: for ν ∈ ω1 \ η
n let qν be the
⊳-smallest condition which extends pn ∪ {ν} and belongs to Dn+1. Then
we define f(ν) as the maximum of qν . Now let E ⊆ ω1 be the club of those
points greater than ηn which are closed under f . Note that f and E are in
Mδ, since they are definable from parameters in this model. It follows that
ot(E ∩ ρδ) = ρδ > ot(Aρδ ∪ (X ∩ ρδ))
Choose two elements ν0 < ν1 < ρδ of E such that [ν0, ν1] ∩ (Aρδ ∪ (X ∩
ρδ)) = ∅. We can choose p
n+1 to be qν0 .
Now the condition
⋃
n<ω p
n ∪ {ρδ} is P -generic for Mδ and for the whole
subtower 〈Mε : ε < γ〉 and satisfies (ii) and (iii). Let p(γ,X) be the ⊳-
smallest condition with these properties and note that p(γ,X) ∈Mγ , since
this condition is definable (using the order ⊳ of H(κ)) from p, X ∩ ρδ and
〈Mε : ε < γ〉. This ends the successor step of the inductive construction.
It is immediate that the condition p(α, ∅) is generic for the whole tower
〈Mγ : γ < α〉. 
The following proposition (due to Shelah) appears in [7, Proposition 3.5]
for full club guessing ladder systems. The proof for weak club guessing is
exactly the same. We provide it for the reader’s convenience.
Proposition 2.6. Let A¯ = 〈Aγ : γ < ω1〉 be a thin β-ladder system and
P a β-proper notion of forcing. If A¯ witness TWCGβ , then A¯ witnesses
TWCGβ in any generic extension with P .
Proof. Let E˙ be a P -name for a club and p a condition in P . It suffices
to prove that there exists an ordinal ρ∗ and condition q ≤ p such that
q forces that the intersection of E˙ with Aρ∗ has order type equal to β.
For so doing, let κ be a sufficiently large regular cardinal and consider an
internally approachable tower M = 〈Mε : ε ∈ ω1〉 of countable elementary
substructures of H(κ) such that A¯, P , E˙ and p are in M0. Let F be the
club of those countable ordinals ρ such that ρ =Mρ∩ω1. Now, by TWCGβ
(applied in V ), there exist ρ∗ ∈ F such that ot(Aρ∗ ∩F ) = β. Note that for
each ρ ∈ Aρ∗ ∩ F , any (Mρ, P )-generic condition forces that ρ ∈ E˙. So, it
suffices to prove that there is a condition extending p which is generic for all
elements of the tower M∗ = 〈Mε : ε ∈ Aρ∗ ∩ F 〉. Given that P is β-proper,
this can be reduced to proving that M∗ is internally approachable, which is
true by the assumptions that A¯ is thin andM is internally approachable. 
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Corollary 2.7. For every indecomposable ordinal γ < ω1 the principle
TWCGγ is consistent with BPFAγ (or PFAγ), relative to a reflecting car-
dinal (or a supercompact).
Proof. We prove only the PFA version. The proof is very similar to the
usual proof of the consistency of PFA, and so we omit the details. We start
with a ground model with a supercompact satisfying TWCGγ (there is one
by the results of [18]). The generic extension that we need is obtained by
a countable support iteration of length a supercompact cardinal, where in
each step of the iteration we only consider names for γ-proper partial orders.
Since the countable support iteration of γ-proper forcing notions is γ-proper
[12, Chapter 5, Theorem 3.5] and γ-proper forcing preserves TWCGγ , we
get a model of both, PFAγ and TWCGγ . 
Together, Theorem 2.5 and Corollary 2.7 prove Theorem 1.1. The sepa-
ration of the axioms PFAα for indecomposable ordinals α < ω1 appears in
Shelah’s [12, Chapter XVII, Remark 3.15]. We are not aware, however, if the
separation with the bounded versions has ever appeared in the literature, so
we mention it in the following corollary.
Corollary 2.8. For indecomposable ordinals α < β < ω1, BPFAβ (or
PFAβ) does not imply BPFAα, relative to a reflecting cardinal (or a su-
percompact).
Proof. By Corollary 2.7 there is a model of BPFAβ (or PFAβ) and TWCGβ ,
relative to a reflecting cardinal (or a supercompact). It cannot satisfy
BPFAα by Theorem 2.5. 
In the remaining part of this section we will prove Theorem 1.2. We will
need an additional piece of notation. Given an indecomposable ordinal β and
a cardinal κ ≤ ω1, a (β, κ)-system is a sequence A¯ = 〈A
α
δ : α ∈ κ, δ ∈ ω1〉
such that for every α and δ, with β dividing δ, the set Aαδ is a closed
unbounded subset of δ of order type β. A (β, κ)-system A¯ is thin if for any
γ ∈ ω1, the set {A
α
δ ∩ γ : α < κ, δ ∈ ω1} is countable.
Note that a (β, κ)-system A¯ can be enumerated as (A¯δ : δ < ω1), but then
we must remember that A¯δ need not be cofinal in δ. Such enumerations will
be used in the proof of Theorem 1.2 below.
The principle WCGκβ asserts the existence of a (β, κ)-system A¯ = 〈A
α
δ :
α ∈ κ, δ ∈ ω1〉 such that for every club D ⊆ ω1, there exists δ ∈ D and
α ∈ κ such that β divides δ and ot(Aαδ ∩ D) = β. The principle TWCG
κ
β
says exactly the same that WCGκβ with the additional requirement that A¯
must be thin.
Lemma 2.9. For any indecomposable ordinal β, TWCGβ is equivalent to
TWCGℵ0β and the same holds for the non-thin versions.
Proof. The two statements have the same proof. We only focus on the thin
versions and we show that TWCGℵ0β implies TWCGβ. So, let 〈A
n
δ : n ∈
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ω, δ ∈ ω1〉 be a (β,ℵ0)-system witnessing TWCG
ℵ0
β . We define a thin β-
ladder system 〈Bδ : δ ∈ ω1〉 as follows. First, for each δ divisible by β fix a
cofinal sequence 〈δn : n ∈ ω〉 ⊆ δ of order type ω. Define Bδ =
⋃
{Bnδ : n ∈
ω}, where Bnδ is equal to A
n
δ \ δn . Now 〈Bδ : δ ∈ ω1〉 is a thin system. To
see this, notice that for each γ ∈ ω1 if δ > γ, δ ∈ ω1 is divisible by β, then
only finitely many of δn’s are below γ and hence Bδ ∩ γ is a union of finitely
many of the sets Anδ ∩ γ \ δn. The fact that 〈Bδ : δ ∈ ω1〉 witnesses TWCGβ
follows directly from the assumption that 〈Anδ : n ∈ ω, δ ∈ ω1〉 witnesses
TWCGℵ0β 
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 1.2.
Proof of Theorem 1.2. The fact that TWCGα does not imply TWCGβ fol-
lows directly from Theorem 1.1. Alternately, to derive this just in ZFC, one
can start with a model of TWCGα + CH + 2
ℵ1 = ℵ2 and then force with
a countable-support iteration of length ω2 of α-proper forcings, killing all
β-thin club sequences.
Now we prove that TWCGβ implies TWCGα. Assume TWCGα fails.
We will show by induction on α′ ∈ [α, β] that TWCGα′ fails. In fact, we
will show that if A¯ = {A¯δ : δ ∈ ω1} enumerates a thin (α
′,ℵ0)-system,
then there exists a club D such that for every δ ∈ ω1 the intersection of A¯δ
with D has order type strictly less than α. The case α′ = α follows from
Lemma 2.9. Assume α′ > α and fix an enumeration {A¯δ : δ ∈ ω1} of a thin
(α′,ℵ0)-system A¯. For each ordinal δ find an increasing cofinal sequence
{δn : n ∈ ω} ⊆ A¯δ of limit points of the set A¯δ such that the order types of
A′(δ, 0) = A¯δ ∩ δ0
and
A′(δ, n + 1) = (A¯δ ∩ δn+1) \ δn
are indecomposable ordinals greater than or equal to α. Now, consider the
thin system enumeration
A′ = {A′(δ, n) : δ ∈ ω1, n ∈ ω},
and note that for each indecomposable π in the semi-open interval [α,α′),
the inductive hypothesis ensures the existence of a club Cpi such that for
every δ and for every n if the order type of A′(δ, n) is equal to π, then
ot(A′(δ, n) ∩Cpi) < α. Note that if A¯ is thin, then the set of those elements
of A′ whose order type is equal to π is a (π,ℵ0)-system. Let C be the
intersection of all the Cpi. Now define the set B¯δ as follows
B¯δ = {δn : n ∈ ω} ∪
⋃
{A′(δ, n) ∩ C : n ∈ ω}.
Note that this set has order type at most α. Also note that if γ < sup A¯δ,
then B¯δ ∩ γ is equal to the union of A¯δ ∩ γ ∩C together with a finite subset
of sup A¯δ. Therefore the system B¯ = {B¯δ : δ ∈ ω1} is thin. Finally, find
a club D subseteq C witnessing that the system B¯ does not guess in the
(α,ℵ0)-sense. Now D is as desired. 
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3. Forcings embeddable into σ-closed ∗ ccc
Recall that a forcing notion P satisfies the uniform Axiom A if there is an
ordering ≤0 on P refining its original ordering such that any ≤0-descending
ω-sequence has a ≤0-lower bound and for any antichain A in P any condition
can be ≤0-extended to become compatible with at most countably many
elements of A. By a quasi-order we mean a reflexive and transitive relation.
Ishiu showed [7, Theorem 4.3] that, up to forcing-equivalence, Axiom A
and uniform Axiom A are equivalent and describe precisely the class of
<ω1-proper quasi-orders. More precisely, he showed that if P is an Axiom
A forcing notion, then there is a quasi-order P ′ which is forcing-equivalent
to P and an ordering ≤0 on P
′ such that P ′ satisfies the uniform Axiom A
via ≤0. This is a motivation for the following definition.
Definition 3.1. A forcing notion P satisfies strong Axiom A if there a quasi-
order P ′, forcing-equivalent to P , with an ordering ≤0 on P
′ such that for
any σ-closed forcing S the product S × P ′ satisfies uniform Axiom A via
≤S × ≤0.
Any forcing of the form R ∗ Q˙, where R is σ-closed and Q˙ is forced to
be ccc, satisfies the uniform Axiom A. The ordering ≤0 on R ∗ Q˙ is simply
≤R ×=˙, i.e. (r1, q˙1) ≤0 (r0, q˙0) if r1 ≤R r0 and r1  q˙0 = q˙1. To see that
≤0 witnesses the uniform Axiom A, take an antichain A in R ∗ Q˙ and a
condition (r0, q˙0) ∈ R ∗ Q˙. Pick any R-generic filter G over V through r0
and note that in V [G] we have that {(q˙)/G : ∃r ∈ G (r, q˙/G) ∈ A} is an
antichain in Q˙/G and hence it is countable by the assumption that R  Q˙ is
ccc. Note that for each (q˙)/G in the above set, there is only one r ∈ G such
that (r, q˙) ∈ A, as A is an antichain. Since R does not add new countable
subsets of the ground model, there is a countable A0 ⊆ A in V such that
for some condition r′ ∈ G we have
(∗) r′  {(r, q˙) ∈ A : r ∈ G˙} = A0.
Enumerate A0 as {(r
′
n, q˙n) : n < ω}. Since r0, r
′ and all the r′n are in
G, we can find r1 ∈ R extending all these conditions. Now we have that
(r1, q˙0) ≤0 (r0, q˙0) and it is enough to check that {(r, q˙) ∈ A : (r, q˙) is
compatible with (r1, q˙0)} is contained in A0. But if (r
′′, q˙′′) ∈ A \ A0 were
compatible with (r1, q˙0), then forcing with a filter G such that r
′′, r1 ∈ G
would give that (r′′, q˙′′) ∈ {(r, q˙) ∈ A : r ∈ G}, contradicting (∗).
Recall that if A is a complete Boolean algebra andB is a complete Boolean
subalgebra of A, then the projection π : A→ B is defined as follows: π(a) =∧
{b ∈ B : a ≤ b}, where the Boolean operation is computed in either of the
two Boolean algebras.
Now we prove Theorem 1.3
Proof of Theorem 1.3. (ii)⇒(i). Suppose P ⋖ R ∗ Q˙, where R is σ-closed
and Q˙ is forced to be ccc. Without loss of generality assume that P is a
complete Boolean subalgebra of ro(R ∗ Q˙) and let π : ro(R ∗ Q˙)→ P be the
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projection. Let
P ′ = {(p, (r, q˙)) : p ∈ P, (r, q˙) ∈ R ∗ Q˙ and p ∧ (r, q˙) 6= 0},
where the Boolean operation is computed in ro(R∗Q˙). Consider the function
π′ : P ′ → P defined as:
π′((p, (r, q˙))) = p ∧ π((r, q˙))
and define the order ≤P ′ on P
′ as follows: (p1, (r1, q˙1)) ≤P ′ (p0, (r0, q˙0)) if
π′((p1, (r1, q˙1))) ≤P π
′((p0, (r0, q˙0))). Thus P
′ becomes a quasi-order with
≤P ′. Note that the definition of ≤P ′ implies that the function π
′ is a dense
embedding from P ′ to P , hence P ′ and P are forcing-equivalent.
Recall that on R ∗ Q˙ we have the natural ordering ≤R×=˙ (see remarks
preceeding this theorem) to witness uniform Axiom A. Let ≤0 on P
′ be
defined as follows: (p1, (r1, q˙1)) ≤0 (p0, (r0, q˙0)) if p1 = p0, r1 ≤R r0 and
r1  q˙1 = q˙0. Now we claim that this ≤0 witnesses the strong Axiom A.
Let S be a σ-closed forcing notion. We need to check that S×P ′ satisfies
uniform Axiom A via ≤S × ≤0. It is clear that S×P
′ is σ-closed with respect
to ≤S × ≤0. Take an antichain A in S × P
′, s ∈ S and (p, (r, q˙)) ∈ P ′. Via
id × π′ we get an antichain A′ in S × P . As every element of ro(R ∗ Q˙) is
a supremum of an antichain in R ∗ Q˙, we can refine the antichain A′ to an
antichain A′′ such that
(a) every element of A′′ is of the form (s, (r, q˙)) for some s ∈ S and
(r, q˙) ∈ R ∗ Q˙,
(b) every element of A′ is the supremum of a subset of A′′.
Now, A′′ is an antichain in S× (R∗Q˙). The latter is the same as (S×R)∗Q˙
(where Q˙, as an R-name naturally becomes an S × R-name). We need the
following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. Let T be a σ-closed forcing notion and C be ccc. Then
T  Cˇ is ccc.
Proof. Suppose not. Let {c˙α : α < ω1} be a T -name for an antichain in Cˇ.
Since T is σ-closed, we can build a descending sequence 〈tα ∈ T : α < ω1〉
and a sequence of conditions 〈cα ∈ C : α < ω1〉 such that
tα  c˙α = cˇα.
But then {cˇα : α < ω1} is an uncountable antichain in C, a contradiction.

Now, Lemma 3.2 implies that if G is any R-generic over V , then in V [G]
we have
S  Q˙/G is ccc.
This means that R  “S  Q˙ is ccc”, or in other words, R × S  Q˙ is ccc.
Since S × R = R× S, by the remarks preceeding this theorem, we get that
≤S×R×=˙ witnesses uniform Axiom A for (S ×R) ∗ Q˙.
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Therefore, there are s′ ≤S s and r
′ ≤R r such that (s
′, (r′, q˙)) is compat-
ible with only countably many elements of A′′. By (b) above, (s′, r′, q˙) is
compatible with only countably many elements of A′ and so is (s′, π(r′, q˙))
since A′ ⊆ S × P . Since (s′, π′(p, (r′, q˙))) ≤S×P (s
′, π(r, q˙)) and by the defi-
nition of ≤P ′ , we get that (s
′, (p, (r′, q˙))) is compatible with only countably
many elements of A. We also have
(s′, (p, (r′, q˙))) ≤S ×≤0 (s, (p, (r, q˙))),
hence ≤S × ≤0 witnesses uniform Axiom A for S ×P
′. This ends the proof
of implication (ii)⇒(i).
(i)⇒(ii). Suppose P satisfies strong Axiom A. Since embeddability into
σ-closed ∗ ccc is invariant under forcing-equivalence, we can assume that the
ordering ≤0 witnessing strong Axiom A is defined on P . We shall construct
a σ-closed forcing notion R and an R-name Q˙ for a ccc forcing such that
P ⋖ R ∗ Q˙. Let R be the forcing with countable subsets of P ordered as
follows: for π0, π1 ⊆ P countable write π1 ≤ π0 if
• for each p ∈ π0 there is q ∈ π1 such that q ≤0 p,
• for each q ∈ π1 the set π0 is predense below q.
Note that R is σ-closed. In any R-generic extension the union of the count-
able subsets of P which belong to the generic filter forms a suborder of P .
Let Q˙ be the canonical name for this subset. We will show that P ⋖R ∗ Q˙
and that Q˙ is forced to be ccc.
Lemma 3.3. The forcing R ∗ Q˙ adds a generic filter for P .
Proof. We show that R forces that the Q˙-generic filter is P -generic over V .
It is enough to show that for any dense open set D ⊆ P and p ∈ P the set
{π ∈ R : (π  p /∈ Q˙) ∨ (∃d ∈ π p ∈ D ∧ d ≤ p)}
is dense in R. Take any π ∈ R and suppose π  p ∈ Q˙. There is π′ ≤ π and
p′ ≤ p such that p′ ∈ π′. Pick d ∈ D such that d ≤ p′. Then π′ ∪ {d} ≤ π is
as needed. 
Note now that for any π ∈ R we have
(⋆) π  π is predense in Q˙.
Indeed, if π′ ≤ π and π′  p ∈ Q˙, then there is π′′ ≤ π′ and q ∈ π′′ such that
q ≤ p. Since π′′ ≤ π, there is r ∈ π and t ≤ r, q. Now π′′ ∪ {t}  t ≤ r, q.
We will be done once we prove the following.
Lemma 3.4. R forces that Q˙ is ccc.
Proof. Suppose that A˙ is an R-name for an uncountable antichain in Q˙.
Assume that A˙ is forced to be of cardinality ω1, namely R  A˙ = {a˙α : α <
ω1}.
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Sublemma 3.5. For each π ∈ R and p ∈ π there are π′ ≤ π, p′ ≤0 p such
that p′ ∈ π′ and a countable Ap ⊆ P such that
π′  {a ∈ A˙ : a is incompatible with p′} ⊆ Ap.
Proof. We build an antichain in R×P . Let C0 ⊆ R be a maximal antichain
below π deciding a˙0 and such that for every ρ ∈ C0 there is b
ρ ∈ ρ such that
bρ ≤ a, where a ∈ P is such that ρ  a = a˙0. Let D0 = {(ρ, b
ρ) : ρ ∈ C0}.
For ξ < ω1 use the fact that R is σ-closed to find a maximal antichain Cξ
below π which refines all Cα for α < ξ, decides a˙ξ and for every ρ ∈ Cξ
there is bρ ∈ ρ such that bρ ≤ a, where a ∈ P is such that ρ  a = a˙ξ. Let
Dξ = {(ρ, b
ρ) : ρ ∈ Cξ}.
Now D =
⋃
ξ<ω1
Dξ is an antichain in R× P . To see that it is enough to
check that if ξ0 < ξ1, (ρ0, b
ρ0) ∈ Dξ0 , (ρ1, b
ρ1) ∈ Dξ1 and ρ1 ≤ ρ0, then b
ρ0
and bρ1 are incompatible in P . Suppose c ≤ bρ0 , bρ1 and put ρ = ρ1 ∪ {c}.
Then
ρ  c ∈ Q˙ and c ≤ bρ1 , bρ0
and hence ρ  a˙ξ0 , a˙ξ1 are compatible. This is a contradiction.
Since R × P satisfies uniform Axiom A via ≤ × ≤0, we can find σ ≤ π,
p′ ≤0 p and a countable subset D
′ ⊆ D such that
{(ρ, a) ∈ D : (ρ, a) is incompatible with (σ, p′)} ⊆ D′.
Let Ap = {a ∈ P : ∃ρ ∈ R (ρ, a) ∈ D
′}. Put π′ = σ ∪ {p′}. 
Take now any π ∈ R. Using Sublemma 3.5 and a bookkepping argument
we find a sequence 〈πn ∈ R : n < ω〉 such that π0 = π and for each n < ω
and p ∈ πn there is mp > n, p
′ ∈ πmp such that p
′ ≤0 p and there is a
countable Ap ⊆ P such that
(⋆⋆) πm  {a ∈ A˙ : a is incompatible with p
′} ⊆ Ap.
For each p ∈
⋃
n<ω πn construct a sequence pn ∈ P such that p0 = p
′ ∈
πmp and if pn ∈ πm, then pn+1 ∈ πm+1 is such that pn+1 ≤0 pn. Let rp be
any condition such that rp ≤0 pn for all n < ω..
We define πω as the family of all such rp for p ∈
⋃
n<ω πn. Note that
πω ≤ πn for each n and by (⋆) and (⋆⋆) we have that
πω 
⋃
{Ap : p ∈
⋃
n<ω
πn} is predense in Q˙.
This contradicts the assumption that A˙ is forced to be uncountable. 
This ends the proof of the implication (ii)⇒(i). 
Now we prove Corollary 1.4.
Proof of Corollary 1.4. Recall the example [12, Chapter XVII, Observation
2.12] of two proper forcing notions whose product collapses ω1. The first of
them is σ-closed and the other is an iteration of the form ccc ∗σ-closed ∗ ccc.
Thus, the latter does not satisfy strong Axiom A but is forcing-equivalent
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to an Axiom A forcing, since it is <ω1-proper. It is not embeddable into
σ-closed ∗ ccc by Theorem 1.3. 
4. Remaining questions
There are a couple of questions which this papers leaves open.
Question 4.1. Is BFA(σ-closed ∗ ccc) equivalent to BAAFA?
Question 4.2. Is strong Axiom A equivalent to the fact that the product
with every σ-closed forcing is <ω1-proper?
Question 4.3. Does Theorem 1.2 hold for WCGα in place of TWCGα?
Question 4.4. Does BFA(σ-closed ∗ ccc) imply 2ℵ0 = ℵ2?
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